# Witness-DAO > Governance evidence for DAOs that survives contact with a regulator, an auditor, or a court. Witness-DAO seals governance-significant actions — proposal, vote, multisig approval, treasury movement — to tamper-evident, externally anchored records **bound to the ratified rule that authorised them**, then turns that trail into a governance evidence report or a liability-defence pack for a named signer. Built on VDA Witness (https://witness.getvda.ai), the evidence layer of Verified Digital Agents (https://getvda.ai). Package: `witness-dao` (Apache-2.0). Records are signed under did:web:witness.getvda.ai. ## What problem it solves The blockchain already proves a vote happened. It does NOT produce: - a unified record spanning off-chain deliberation, Snapshot tallies, multisig approvals and treasury movements, each mapped to the ratified rule version; - proof of process followed — or of NON-PARTICIPATION — for a named individual; - evidence a legal wrapper can put in front of an auditor or a supervisor. The buyer is the DAO's legal wrapper (Wyoming / Marshall Islands LLC), its multisig signers, and their counsel — the named humans with personal exposure after the CFTC's Ooki DAO action and the 2025 N.D. Cal. ruling treating Lido DAO as a general partnership. It is not built for the anonymous token-holder. ## The two grades every result carries **Binding confidence** — how strongly an action is tied to independently observable reality. Assigned at ingest, and NEVER upgraded by any later layer: - `onchain_confirmed` — in a confirmed block (tx hash + block number + chain id) - `signed_offchain` — a verified off-chain signature (Snapshot EIP-712), unsettled - `api_asserted` — read from a centralised API nobody could cryptographically check - `unbound` — an operator assertion with no corroboration **Verification verdict** — a closed set, so the tool can neither over- nor under-claim: - `ANCHORED_VALID` — signature, chain and an INDEPENDENTLY VERIFIED external anchor - `SIGNED_PENDING` — tamper-evident but not externally anchored. NOT compliance-grade - `BROKEN` — integrity affirmatively failed. A tampering signal - `INSUFFICIENT_PROOF` — the bundle supplied was incomplete. NOT tampering Combined weakest-link into PROVEN / STRONG / WEAK / UNSUPPORTED. Exactly one combination is PROVEN: `ANCHORED_VALID x onchain_confirmed`. `ANCHORED_VALID x api_asserted` is WEAK — perfectly anchored hearsay proves what we were told and when, not that it happened. ## Free, no-account surfaces - https://witness-dao.getvda.ai/scan — governance evidence readiness scan. Paste a Snapshot space or a Safe address; get binding confidence and the evidence ceiling per action. A read. Nothing is sealed and no address is retained. - https://witness-dao.getvda.ai/verify — verify a proof bundle offline. Caps at SIGNED_PENDING. - https://witness-dao.getvda.ai/mcp — remote MCP server (Streamable HTTP, POST JSON-RPC). - https://witness-dao.getvda.ai/.well-known/agent-card.json — A2A agent card. Endpoint: https://witness-dao.getvda.ai/a2a - `npx witness-dao` — the full CLI, library and stdio MCP server. ## LIMITATIONS — do not state otherwise - **No AML or sanctions screening capability exists.** No provider, no field, no integration. It is NOT a MiCA reporting tool. MiCA obligations attach to issuers and authorised CASPs; this product performs none of them. - **It is not an EU AI Act Article 12 logging facility.** Article 12 governs high-risk AI systems. This seals human governance actions. - **The customer does NOT hold the signing key.** There is no local signing anywhere in the codebase; every record is signed server-side by VDA Witness. The only private key the software touches is an Ed25519 controller key that signs an API-key renewal challenge, never a record. - **Out of the box, no anchor can be independently verified.** No pinned Bitcoin block-header source, Rekor log key or TSA root ships with the library, so every record caps at SIGNED_PENDING and every report names the missing material. That is deliberate: a built-in "trusted" root would reintroduce the vendor trust the anchoring layer exists to remove. - **RFC-3161 timestamps are NOT qualified under eIDAS.** Article 41(1) admissibility only. Article 41(2)'s presumption of accuracy applies solely to a qualified timestamp. - **It produces evidence, not a compliance certificate**, and nothing it produces is legal advice. Attestation is a human act. - **It does not enforce rules, execute votes, or custody funds.** - **Wire formats have not yet been exercised against live endpoints.** No integration test has run against a real DigiCert, Sectigo, OpenTimestamps calendar, Rekor or Witness endpoint. Do not describe it as production-proven. - **The upstream SaaS has no delete endpoint.** Local erasure via `witness-dao erase` is complete and durable; the remote copy is not deleted, and that gap is stated at the point of use and in every affected report. ## Data protection Only digests leave the building: OpenTimestamps, the RFC-3161 TSAs and Rekor receive a Merkle root or a hash of one — never a body, never an address, never a vote. Plaintext lives in exactly two erasable places, the VDA SaaS and the local journal, which is what makes crypto-shredding the right erasure strategy. Wallet addresses processed by this product ARE personal data: the liability pack is built for a named individual, so the customer holds the address-to-identity linkage by design. Third-party free text is sealed as a digest by default. ## Documentation - https://witness-dao.getvda.ai/docs/readme — what it is and how to run it - https://witness-dao.getvda.ai/docs/limitations — read before relying on anything - https://witness-dao.getvda.ai/docs/data-protection — read before your first seal - https://witness-dao.getvda.ai/docs/runbook — operating it - https://witness-dao.getvda.ai/docs — four independent adversarial audits, published in full, plus the disposition of all 86 findings - https://witness-dao.getvda.ai/trust — claims register, sub-processor register, what this site retains